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Abstract:

The past several years have seen an increasing number of pharmacists refuse to

dispense emergency contraception, an effective, post-coital form of contraception, on the
grounds that the drug violates their personal beliefs. This Article addresses the impact of those
pharmacist refusals under existing principles of tort law. The Article draws on existing
pharmacy case law, state-specific refusal clauses, and ethics statements promulgated by
professional pharmacy associations to investigate whether pharmacists have a legal duty to
dispense emergency contraception, notwithstanding religious or ethical objections. Concluding
that in most states, such a legal duty does exist, the Article develops a “wrongful conception”
theory of tort liability for refusing pharmacists and argues that by refusing to dispense
emergency contraception, pharmacists subject themselves and their employers to potential civil
liability, including significant compensatory and punitive damages.
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I first learned about emergency contraception as a first-year college student. Returning
from the semester break just after New Year, a friend and I began comparing notes about our
respective holidays. “It was awful,” she told me. “You try driving a crying girl around for hours,
searching for a doctor’s office or a Planned Parenthood that would be open on New Years Day.
Let me tell you, no one is open.”
My friend and her car had been pressed into service by her dear friend from high school,
a young woman whose New Year festivities had been punctuated not with the dropping of the
ball but with the breaking of a condom. My friend explained to me that when contraception fails
or for whatever reason is not used, emergency contraception, or “EC” for short, provides a
woman’s last, best hope for avoiding an unplanned pregnancy. The drug provides a high dose of
hormones similar to those contained in regular birth control pills, and is up to 89% effective—
but only if taken within 72 hours of unprotected sex, and the sooner the better.1
New Years Day fell on a Friday that year, and clinic after clinic had already posted their
“closed” signs for the weekend. This was at the beginning of 1999, one year after the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) first approved EC for prescription use under the brand name
Preven,2 but nearly eight years before the agency would approve the drug for limited over-the-
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Press Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG Steps Up Efforts to Get
Emergency Contraception to Women (May 8, 2006) (available at http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications
/press_releases/nr05-08-06-1.cfm) (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) [hereinafter ACOG Press Release].
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Emergency contraception has been an established off-label use of traditional birth control pills since the
1960s. Charlotte Ellertson, History and Efficacy of Emergency Contraception: Beyond Coca-Cola, 22 INT’L FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 52 (1996). Despite widespread acceptance of the practice, pharmaceutical companies were reluctant to
market their traditional birth control pills as off-label emergency contraception, citing concerns about potential
liability and a limited potential for profit. Gina Kolata, Morning-After Contraceptive to Be Marketed, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1998 at A12. In February 1997, the FDA responded to a citizen petition from the Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy by publishing an official notice in the Federal Register stating that the efficacy and safety of certain
off-label emergency contraceptive regimens had already been demonstrated and that the agency would therefore not
require expensive new drug trials for applications to market and distribute emergency contraception. Prescription
Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for Use as Postcoital Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg.
8610 (Feb. 25, 1997). Preven, which consists of both progestin and estrogen, was approved by the FDA in
September 1998 as a prescription-only emergency contraception regimen, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
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counter availability under the brand name Plan B.3 The 72-hour window of opportunity was
rapidly closing for my friend’s charge, and without a standing EC prescription from her doctor or
an over-the-counter option for obtaining the drug, membership in the anxious sorority of women
who nervously counted and recounted the days to their next period was about to increase by one.
For a drug that has the power to obviate the fraught decision among abortion, adoption,
and unprepared parenthood, there had to be a better way. For the last several years, pro-choice
advocacy groups thought that “better way” was to increase public awareness about the drug’s
existence and to make EC available on an over-the-counter basis. They are succeeding on both
counts. Since 1999, EC’s profile has risen considerably. Women are becoming aware of the
drug in increasing numbers, and the number of EC prescriptions filled nationwide doubled
between 2004 and 2006.4 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists initiated
their “Ask Me” campaign in May 2006 to increase awareness of and access to EC by
encouraging women to get just-in-case EC prescriptions from their gynecologists during their
regular appointments so that should the patients later need a dose, they would not have to
scramble for a prescription.5 And in August 2006, after a controversial, protracted, and

FDA APPROVES APPLICATION FOR PREVEN EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION KIT, Sept. 2, 1998, at http://www.fda. gov/
bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00892.html (last accessed Aug. 31, 2006), but was withdrawn from the market in May
2004 because it had more side effects and was less effective as a method of EC than Plan B, which consists only of
progestin. And Then There Was One: Barr Withdraws Preven, CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY UPDATE, Sept. 1,
2004. Plan B is currently the only drug marketed as a post-coital contraceptive.
3

See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access for Plan B for Women
18 and Older, Prescription Remains Required for Those 17 and Under, Aug. 24, 2006, at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01436.html (last accessed Aug. 29, 2006) [hereinafter FDA Approval].
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Jonathon D. Rockoff, Plan B battle shifts to states; FDA’s inaction on ‘morning after’ pill boosts
momentum, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 25, 2006, at 1A.
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ACOG Press Release, supra note 1.
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according to critics, unscientific and politicized, FDA review, that agency approved Plan B for
over-the-counter availability for women age 18 and older.6
But this increasing awareness about EC among the public has not always been
accompanied by improved access to the drug. Some pharmacists who believe life begins at
conception—the moment of fertilization—equate EC, and in some cases even traditional birth
control pills, with abortion because they fear it could interfere with the implantation of a
fertilized egg in the uterus. Although there is no scientific evidence of EC ever preventing a
fertilized egg from implanting, it is impossible to prove a negative—no one can demonstrate,
logically or scientifically, that EC could never inhibit implantation.7 These pharmacists therefore
refuse to fill prescriptions for such drugs on the grounds that to do so would be to facilitate
abortion in violation of their moral or religious beliefs.8 “Advocates on both sides say the
refusals appear to be spreading, often surfacing only in the rare instances when women file
complaints” against the refusing pharmacists.9 Although the frequency with which pharmacists
refuse to fill prescriptions for EC and traditional contraceptives can be assessed only on an
anecdotal basis, such cases have been reported around the United States.10 In addition to
6

Women 17 or younger would still need a prescription for EC. Under the terms of the FDA approval, the
drug would continue to be stocked behind the pharmacy counter, and pharmacy clients would be required to present
either a valid prescription or proof of age before the pharmacist on duty could dispense the drug. FDA Approval,
supra note 3.
7

Judy Peres & Jeremy Manier, ‘Morning-after pill’ not abortion, scientists say, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 2005 at

1A.
8

See, e.g., Todd C. Frankel, I’m sorry, I won’t fill that prescription, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 4,
2005, at B1; Charisse Jones, Druggists refuse to give out pill, say their religion forbids the use of contraceptives,
USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2004, at 3A.
9

Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A1.
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See id. (refusals to dispense have been reported in California, Washington, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Texas, New Hampshire, Ohio, and North Carolina). Other refusals have been reported in Arizona,
Calrla McClain, Rape victim: ‘Morning after’ pill denied, AZ. DAILY STAR, Oct. 23, 2005; and Missouri,. Frankel,
supra note 8.
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refusing to dispense EC or traditional contraceptives to women bearing valid prescriptions, some
pharmacists have refused to return those prescription slips to their clients or to transfer the
prescription elsewhere, making it difficult or impossible for the clients to obtain the drugs.11
Still other pharmacists have publicly berated and humiliated women seeking contraception or
emergency contraception, inquiring into their sexual practices,12 and calling them murderers and
baby killers.13
“More and more pharmacists are becoming aware of their right to conscientiously refuse
to pass objectionable medications across the counter,” explains a representative of the Christian
Legal Society’s Center for Law and Religious Freedom. “We are on the very front edge of a
wave that’s going to break not too far down the line.”14 How large that wave is, and when it
might break, is anybody’s guess.
With the FDA’s limited approval of an over-the-counter option for EC, the frequency of
such refusals to dispense seems likely to increase. Although women over 18 will no longer need
a prescription to obtain EC, the drug will still be stocked behind pharmacy counters so the
pharmacist on duty can examine the client’s proof of age and can further inspect the prescription
clients 17 or younger must present. This policy of stocking the drug behind the pharmacy
11

See Jo Mannies, ‘Pill’ dispute here costs pharmacist her job, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2006, at
A1. Karen L. Brauer, of Pharmacists for Life, International, likens returning a client’s prescription to offering to call
a hit man: “That’s like saying, ‘I don’t kill people myself but let me tell you about the guy down the street who
does.’ What’s that saying? ‘I will not off your husband, but I know a buddy who will?’ It’s the same thing.” Stein,
supra note 9.
12

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Neil T. Noesen, R. Ph., Case File No. 01 PHM 080, Proposed Final
Decision and Order (Wis. Pharm. Exam. Bd., Div. Enforcement, Feb. 28, 2005, at ¶¶ 26-28 (pharmacist asked
whether client would use birth control pill for contraception purposes, and when she said yes, he refused to assist her
further or transfer her prescription elsewhere) [hereinafter In re Noesen].
13

Roger J. Limoges, Prescriptions denied: pharmacy refusal clauses have become the latest battleground in
the provision of safe and legal medical services, CONSCIENCE, Sept. 22, 2005, at 36; Betty Cuniberti, In rural
Missouri, pharmacists emerge as pastor, governor and Surgeon General, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 1, 2005,
at E1;
14

Stein, supra note 9.
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counter makes the pharmacist EC’s “primary gatekeeper.”15 At pharmacies with larger staffs,
pharmacy technicians may be empowered to dispense EC to women over 18, but even so, the
universe of people empowered with this gatekeeper role remains quite small. Because the
effectiveness of EC decreases so dramatically over a relatively short period of time, a single
pharmacist’s refusal to dispense the drug may mean the difference between an unplanned
pregnancy and a sigh of relief. Even in an urban area with multiple pharmacists, finding one
who both stocks EC and is willing to dispense it can take days,16 and this at a time when anxiety,
trauma, or embarrassment may most impede a woman’s ability to undertake a diligent search for
EC in the face of repeated refusals. The pharmacist’s gatekeeper role means not only can he or
she refuse to dispense the medication, but also has a unique ability to harass or insult women
who seek it, or to prevent underage women from getting it at all by refusing to return or transfer
their prescription elsewhere.
Pharmacists on the whole are adamant that they have the ethical and legal right to refuse
to dispense medications they find objectionable.17 Whether or not this is true has been the
subject of debate.18 Very little scholarship exists analyzing how courts would likely construe
15

Id.
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In Tuscon, a rape victim spent three days searching dozens of pharmacies for one that both had EC in stock
and that had a pharmacist on duty who would dispense it to her. McClain, supra note 10.
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Sixty-nine percent of pharmacists believe they should have the right to refuse to dispense drugs they find
objectionable, HCD Research, Pharmacists Believe They Should Have Authority to Refuse emergency
Contraception Prescriptions, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.hcdi.net/News/PressRelease.cfm?ID=103 (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006) and two major professional pharmacy associations have issued ethics statements in support of
a pharmacist’s right to refuse, see infra note 40.
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See e.g., Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008,
2011 (Nov. 4, 2004) (concluding that “pharmacists who object should, as a matter of ethics and law, provide
alternatives for patients” to obtain EC but need not dispense the drug themselves); Sarah J. Vokes, Just Fill the
Prescription: Why Illinois’ Emergency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and
Contraception in the Pharmacy Context, 25 L. & INEQUALITY 399 (2006) (arguing that pharmacists have a legal
duty to dispense EC); Charu A. Chanrasekhar, Rx for Drugstore Discrimination: Challenging Pharmacy Refusals to
Dispense Prescription Contraceptives Under State Public Accommodation Laws, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 101 (2006)
(developing a claim that refusals to dispense contraceptives, including EC, may be litigated as unlawful sex
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pharmacists’ duty of care in the context of EC—whether, in the absence of a medical
justification for refusal, they must dispense the drug or whether they may act in accord with the
dictates of their conscience without being subject to liability.19 Ultimately, this legal issue may
be settled on a state-by-state basis as legislatures and licensing boards resolve the debate by
either allowing pharmacists to refuse or requiring them to dispense EC. But in the meantime,
what duty of care does a pharmacist owe to a woman seeking EC? What recourse, if any, does a
woman have when a pharmacist’s conscientious objection threatens to moot her right of access?
This article develops a framework for assessing pharmacists’ duty of care with respect to
dispensing prescription and nonprescription, pharmacy-only drugs, both in a general sense and in
the specific context of EC, concluding that absent a medical justification for refusing to dispense,
pharmacists have a legal duty to dispense EC, whether by prescription or by non-prescription
request (Section I.A.). The article then analyzes the impact various states’ refusal clauses may
have on that generally applicable duty (Section I.B.), concluding that in most states a refusal to
dispense EC is best described as an act of civil disobedience, the nature of which does not
insulate pharmacists from tort liability (Section I.C.). Finally, the article sketches a claim of
wrongful conception as an example of how pharmacists’ breach of their duty to dispense EC
might result in civil liability (Section II.).
I.

DO PHARMACISTS HAVE A DUTY TO DISPENSE EC?

discrimination in a place of public accommodation and further concluding that Title VII, which prohibits religious
discrimination in employment, does not guarantee pharmacists a right of refusal); Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the
Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 Az. L. Rev. 469, 512
(2006) (arguing that “[b]y limiting the reasons pharmacists may refuse to fill prescriptions to valid medical and legal
concerns, state pharmacy laws implicitly prohibit refusals for other reasons, including religious, personal, or moral
belierfs.”).
19

Although many of the considerations discussed in this Article may also apply in the context of traditional
birth control, this Article focuses specifically on pharmacists’ duty to dispense EC because of the unique challenges
posed by that drug’s limited over-the-counter status and the need for quick access by women in order to maximize
efficacy.
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A.

Establishing the Baseline

A direct analogy to the duty analysis in other medical malpractice negligence cases, and
in particular the wrongful conception cases discussed below, 20 is complicated somewhat by the
question of precisely when a duty arises. The traditional medical malpractice case involves a
medical professional who has affirmatively undertaken care of the patient-plaintiff and then
performed his or her undertaken duty negligently, whereas the pharmacist who refuses to
dispense EC arguably has not assumed the role of healthcare provider, and has in fact actively
refused to step into such a role with respect to that client’s request for that drug.
The question of whether pharmacists have a legal duty to dispense all safe, validly
prescribed drugs or whether they may refuse for non-medical reasons to fill such a prescription is
a murky one. Pharmacists have simply never before argued that they have a right of
conscientious objection to aspects of their job, at least not a courtroom setting. In the dearth of
directly applicable case law, commentators who have addressed what duties pharmacists possess
with respect to EC have largely ignored the existing body of common law, assuming as a starting
point either than a duty does or does not exist, and have proceeded with their analysis based on
that initial assumption.21 This Article takes a somewhat different tack, arguing that based on
how courts have construed pharmacists’ duties in other contexts, and the rationales that
controlled in those decisions, a compelling legal argument exists that absent a medical
20

See discussion in text, infra at II.A.

21

Vokes, supra note 18 (based on Code of Ethics adopted by professional pharmacy association and
pharmacists’ monopoly on prescription drug distribution, pharmacists have a duty to dispense); Cantor & Baum,
supra note 18 at 2011; Dennis Rambaud, Note, Prescription Contraceptives and the Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse:
Examining the Efficacy of Conscience Laws, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 195 (2006) (based on ethics
statements adopted by professional pharmacy associations and a single case construing a pharmacist’s duty to
dispense prescriptions, the pharmacist has satisfied his or her duty by refusing to dispense and referring the client
elsewhere); Donald W. Herbe, Note, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a Pharmacist’s Right to
Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J. L. & HEALTH 77 (2004) (based on ethics
statements adopted by professional pharmacy associations, the pharmacist has satisfied his or her duty by refusing to
dispense and referring the client elsewhere).
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justification for refusal or an applicable state refusal clause, pharmacists already have a duty to
dispense all validly prescribed drugs and all nonprescription drugs that are available only from a
pharmacist.
Although case law provides some useful guidance for delineating the outer edge of a
pharmacist’s duty, most of this guidance exists in dicta, as virtually all cases construing the
pharmacist’s duty have arisen from plaintiffs’ assertions that in affirmatively filling a
prescription the pharmacist neglected some other duty, whether by filling the prescription
inaccurately,22 by accurately filling an incorrectly prescribed lethal dose,23 or by failing to warn
of possible side effects24 or of potential negative drug interactions.25 The murkiness of this
question—whether a duty to dispense EC exists—is further compounded by the fact that the
terms of FDA’s approval make EC an over-the-counter drug for women over 18 and a
prescription-only drug for women 17 and younger. This difference in dispensing protocols could
potentially result in a different standard of care with respect to minors and to women 18 and
older because a legal duty to dispense a safe, validly prescribed prescription drug might not
necessarily translate to a duty to dispense nonprescription drugs such as EC, or vice versa.

22

See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (pharmacist incorrectly dispensed
tranquilizers instead of prescribed birth control pills)
23

See Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 523-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (pharmacy found negligent when
pharmacist filled a prescription for what he knew was a lethal dose).
24

See e.g. Allberry v. Parkmore Drug, 834 N.E.2d 199 (Ct. App. Ind. 2005) (pharmacist had no duty to warn
client of need to seek medical attention if after using drug client had erection lasting more than four hours); Cottam
v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814 (pharmacist had no duty to warn of possible side effect of permanent
impotence); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1989) (pharmacist did not have duty to warn of
potential for prescription drug to cause birth defects).
25

See Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Ct. App. Az. 1994) (pharmacist
has duty to warn patient when two prescriptions negatively interact with one another); Hand v. Krakowski, 89
A.D.2d 650, 651 (N.Y. 1982) (pharmacist had duty to warn client of negative interactions of prescription with
alcohol where pharmacist knew client to be an alcoholic).
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Case law is scarce on the question of whether a pharmacist has discretion to refuse to
dispense safe, validly prescribed drugs. 26 Moreover, no cases have construed whether a
pharmacist has a legal duty to dispense a nonprescription drug available exclusively from behind
the pharmacy counter, either in the context of EC or similarly limited-access drugs, such as cold
medicines containing pseudoephedrine. In this vacuum of directly applicable case law,
therefore, any analysis of how courts would likely analyze a pharmacist’s duty with respect to
EC is necessarily inferential. Nevertheless, a woman facing an unplanned pregnancy as a result
of her pharmacist’s refusal must, before bringing a tort action against her pharmacist, assess how
a court would likely define a pharmacist’s duty with respect to dispensing EC. Furthermore, a
rigorous attempt to delineate that duty can assist pharmacists to define more precisely what they
may be risking should they refuse to dispense as an act of conscience. It is in light of this utility
that I offer the following framework for analyzing the pharmacist’s duty with respect to
dispensing EC.
It is undisputed that pharmacists owe a duty of care to their clients. Though the question
of what standard of care the pharmacist must adhere to with respect to any given client is a
question for the fact-finder,27 practitioners of skilled professions such as pharmacists “have a

26

One case upholding disciplinary action against a pharmacist who refused to fill or transfer a client’s birth
control prescription specifically declined to address whether Wisconsin imposes such a duty on pharmacists,
deciding on other grounds the issue of what sanctions, if any, were appropriate. In re Noesen, supra note 12. One
Saturday in 2002, pharmacist Neil Noesen refused to either fill or transfer a client’s prescription for birth control
pills. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28-33. The next day, the client returned with two police officers and Noesen again refused to
transfer or to fill the client’s prescription. Id. at ¶ 39. Two days after her initial attempt to fill her birth control
prescription, and after Noeson’s two-day shift was over, the client was able to fill her prescription. Id. at ¶ 43. The
Administrative Law Judge found that due to the delay she incurred as a result of Noesen’s refusal to dispense, and
the resultant missed dose, she had to use a backup form of contraception for the next month and was subject to
physical and emotional harm from anxiety about an unplanned pregnancy. Id. at ¶ 42, 50. The Administrative Law
Judge framed the central issue as “whether by refusing to transfer the patient’s prescription on the basis of his
conscientious objection, Respondent [Noesen] departed from a standard of care ordinarily exercised by a pharmacist
and which harmed or could have harmed the patient.” Id. at *8. The issue of whether Noesen had an affirmative
duty to dispense the prescription was not before the tribunal. Id. at *9.
27

Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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duty of care to conform to the generally recognized and accepted practices in their profession.”28
Because the FDA’s approval sets up a two-tiered distribution system for EC based on the age of
the woman seeking it, the duty of care a pharmacist owes a client seeking EC must be analyzed
first with respect to those bearing a prescription, and then with respect to those to whom the drug
is available without a prescription.
1.

Duty to Dispense Emergency Contraception As Prescription Drug

Case law supports the proposition that the pharmacist, as the possessor of a legal
monopoly on the dispensing of prescription drugs, may not exercise nonmedical discretion by
refusing to dispense prescriptions he or she finds objectionable, but rather must accurately fill all
safe, valid prescriptions presented by a client. 29 The circumstances under which a pharmacist
may depart from a physician’s prescription are limited to those instances where a departure is
essential to ensure the client’s health and safety—unless the prescription would medically
endanger the client, the pharmacist has no discretion as to whether to fill it.30 So pervasive is the
belief that pharmacists should not meddle in the doctor-patient relationship that most courts have
declined to require pharmacists even to warn clients when dispensing drugs with such serious
possible side effects as addiction,31 birth defects,32 or impotence.33 Even in these high-stakes

28

Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1996).

29

See Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1989) (recognizing that prescription drugs
are unlike other products because their distribution system is “highly restricted,” and pharmacists, therefore lack
discretion as to which products they will make available to consumers); Heredia v. Johnson, 827 F. Supp. 1522,
1525 (D. Nev. 1993) (“At a minimum, a pharmacist must be held to a duty to fill prescriptions as prescribed and
properly label them (include the proper warnings) and be alert for plain error.” Id.).
30

Nev. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Garrigus, 496 P.2d 748 (Nev. 1972) (“It is not for the pharmacist to second
guess a licensed physician unless in such circumstances that would be obviously fatal.” Id.). See also France v.
State, 506 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1986) (finding pharmacist negligent for failing to dispense inmate’s skin
medication, and construing the pharmacist’s duty as “mix[ing] and dispens[ing] the salve as prescribed by
claimant’s doctor.” Id. at 255).
31

Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455 (Tx. Ct. App. 2001)
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contexts, most courts have held that no duty to warn exists, reasoning that the imposition of such
a duty on pharmacists “would place the pharmacist between the physician—who knows the
patient’s physical condition—and the patient and could lead to harmful interference in the
patient-physician relationship.”34
Such interference has the potential for harm where it might upset the balance between
risk and benefit already struck by the doctor, presumably in consultation with the patient, and
might lead the client-patient to forgo medical treatment deemed appropriate or necessary by the
doctor. Courts, concerned that a pharmacist not adversely affect a client’s ability to pursue a
course of treatment determined by his or her doctor to be most appropriate, have held that “[t]he
pharmacist does not have discretion to alter or refuse to fill a prescription because the risks and
benefits of that prescription for that particular patient have already been weighed by the
physician.”35
In the duty-to-warn scenario, the potential for interference in the doctor-patient
relationship is relatively mild because the pharmacist’s clients still have the option of consuming
the medication prescribed by their doctor, notwithstanding the pharmacist’s warnings. If courts
have been concerned even by this relatively mild risk of interference, they are unlikely to permit
the pharmacist to interfere more concretely and conclusively by refusing altogether to dispense
the drug that the physician, in his or her considered professional opinion, has prescribed. Absent
some medical necessity, such as preventing the client from taking a mistakenly prescribed lethal

32

Coyle, 548 A.2d 1383.

33

Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814 (Mass. 2002).

34

Allberry v. Parkmor Drug, 834 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

35

Cottam, 764 N.E.2d at 821, citing Coyle, 584 A.2d 1383.
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dose, the role of the pharmacist is simply to supply the drug as prescribed. In construing the
pharmacist’s duty of care, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that:
Unlike the marketing system for most other products, the
distribution system for prescription drugs is highly restricted.
Pharmacists, as suppliers, do not freely choose which “products”
they will make available to consumers in any given instance, and
patients, as consumers, do not freely choose which “product” to
buy. Physicians exercising sound medical judgment act as
intermediaries in the chain of distribution, preempting, as it were,
the exercise of discretion by the supplier-pharmacist, and, within
limits, by the patient-consumer.36
Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where pharmacists may be empowered to refuse to dispense a
valid prescription, the only circumstances where such an act has been recognized as permissible
involve those necessary to safeguard the client’s health and safety.37
Some commentators have suggested that formally adopted ethics statements, because
they are adopted by professional associations and therefore indicate the “generally recognized
and accepted practices in [the] profession,”38 constitute the final word on the pharmacist’s
standard of care.39 The two main professional pharmacy organizations have adopted ethics
statements in support of pharmacists’ right to conscientiously object to providing any drug they

36

Coyle, 548 A.2d at 1386.

37
See Cohn v. Department of Professional Regulation, 477 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding
Board of Pharmacy order declining to suspend, revoke, or take other disciplinary action against pharmacist who
filled valid prescriptions for quaaludes). In Cohn, the hearing officer characterized petitioner’s grounds for seeking
disciplinary action as an assertion that the pharmacist “has a moral duty to make a determination of whether the
doctor has prescribed a medication which is ‘good’ for the patient.” Cohn, 477 So.2d at 1052. Finding no basis for
the claim that pharmacists have a duty to make such a “moral” judgment, or even that they are empowered to do so
as a matter of discretion, the hearing officer recommended levying no sanctions against the dispensing pharmacist.
Id. at 1052-53. See also Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1994) (where client refilled
addictive prescription medication at a rate much faster than prescribed, pharmacist had duty to refuse to dispense
further refills).
38

Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1996).

39

See e.g., Rambaud, supra note 21 at 200.
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find ethically or morally problematic, 40 and these commentators have interpreted these
statements to mean that pharmacists have no duty to fill prescriptions for EC.41 This nearly
exclusive reliance on ethics statements in construing pharmacists’ standard of care, however, is
misplaced. Although ethics policies and standards of practice adopted by professional
organizations “may be a potential source of guidance on a pharmacist’s duty of care generally,”
they are not dispositive.42 Courts base their deference to the practices and standards developed
within a profession on “the healthy respect which the courts have had for the learning of a fellow
profession, and their reluctance to overburden it with liability based on uneducated judgment.”43
As discussed in more depth below, however, where the relevant standards are not based on
particular professional expertise, such deference is inappropriate. Notwithstanding evidence to
the contrary that a particular practice is generally recognized and accepted among practitioners,
“when the jury are considered competent to do so, they are permitted to find that a practice
generally followed by the medical profession is negligent.”44
Given the nature of the pharmacy ethics statements at issue, the fact finder is certainly
competent to independently evaluate whether a pharmacist’s refusal to dispense EC was
40

See American Pharmacy Association, 2004 House of Delegates Report of the Policy Review Committee,
available at http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&section=About_APhA1&template=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=224 (last visited Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter APhA Refusal Statement];
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, Ethics Positions, available at
http://www.ashp.org/bestpractices/ethics/Ethics_Positions.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter ASHSP
Refusal Statement].

41

See e.g., Herb, supra note 21 (concluding, “When the pharmacist refuses to dispense and then refers, if he
has given a good faith referral, she has probably satisfied reasonable care.” Id. at 90); Accord Rambaud, supra note
21 at 221. It should be noted that even those commentators who have asserted that no duty to dispense exists have
inferred from the ethics statements a duty to refer. Herb at 90; Rambaud at 221.
42

See Evans, 478 S.E.2d at 848 (involving the Code of Ethics promulgated by the American Pharmacy
Association, id.)
43

PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 32, 189 (5th ed. 1984).

44

Id.
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negligent and should not treat ethics statements as dispositive. In 2004, the American Pharmacy
Association (“APhA”) Policy Review Committee voted to retain language it first adopted in
1998, which reads, “APhA recognizes the individual pharmacist’s right to exercise conscientious
refusal and supports the establishment of systems to ensure patient’s access to legally prescribed
therapy without compromising the pharmacist’s right of conscientious refusal.”45 In 2002, the
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (“ASHSP”) reviewed and retained its statement
on conscientious objection, which reads, “ASHP recognizes a pharmacist’s right to conscientious
objection to morally, religiously, or ethically troubling therapies and supports the establishment
of systems that protect the patient’s right to obtain legally prescribed and medically indicated
treatments while reasonably accommodating the pharmacist’s right of conscientious objection.”46
The policy statements adopted by these two pharmacy associations do not involve scientific or
technical competence or an evaluation of medical risk or benefit. They do not require an
understanding of chemistry, physiology, or any of the other fields pharmacists must study in the
course of their professional training. The issue of whether a pharmacist must fill all safe, valid
prescriptions despite any ethical or moral objections he or she may have is fundamentally an
ethical rather than a technical one. No specialized technical or professional expertise is required
to address the issue competently, and pharmacists are in no better position than are laypeople in
navigating its boundaries. Deferring to the ethical and policy statements of the APhA and the
ASHSP would allow pharmacists to set the bounds of their professional duties to society in
matters in which they have no professional expertise and in ways which are nonresponsive to

45

APhA Refusal Statement, supra note 40.

46

ASHSP Refusal Statement, supra note 40.
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larger societal need or input.47 Because the policy statements of the APhA and ASHSP are not
embodiments of particularized professional expertise, because pharmacists are not uniquely able
to competently assess how to navigate the ethical conflict inherent in the refusal-to-dispense
scenario, and because pharmacists’ preferences with respect to the delineation of their
professional duty of care are, on the whole, contrary to those of larger society, the ethics
statements should not be used as conclusive sources for defining the pharmacist’s duty of care.
Further, the organizations’ ethics statements are of limited utility in assessing the
pharmacist’s standard of care in the context of EC. In neither iteration is the pharmacist’s ability
to refuse absolute. Both policies stress the importance of balancing the pharmacist’s interest in
acting in accord with his or her ethical beliefs and the client’s interest in obtaining the treatment
he or she seeks. Though most commentators have focused on the pharmacist’s interest to the
exclusion of that of the woman seeking EC, the pharmacy associations’ ethics statements do not
support such tunnel vision. The importance of the client’s interest is further underscored by the
APhA’s Code of Ethics, which states:
“A pharmacist respects the autonomy and dignity of each patient.
A pharmacist promotes the right of self-determination and
recognizes individual self-worth by encouraging patients to
participate in decisions about their health. A pharmacist
communicates with patients in terms that are understandable. In all
cases, a pharmacist respects personal and cultural differences
among patients.” 48

47

In fact, polls demonstrate that most Americans—78 percent—do not believe a pharmacist should be
allowed to refuse to fill contraceptive prescriptions on religious or moral grounds; only 16 percent believe
pharmacists should be able to so refuse. CBS News.com, Religion at the Drugstore, Nov. 23, 2004, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/23/opinion/polls/ main657413.shtml, last visited Oct. 16, 2006.

48

Am. Pharm. Ass’n, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, Art. III, adopted by the American Pharmacists
Association membership Oct. 27, 1994, available at http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&
template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2809 (last accessed Sept. 7, 2006).
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As discussed in more depth below, in any given situation these two competing sets of interests
may be irreconcilable, leaving the fact finder with little guidance as to whether the pharmacist
has satisfied the applicable duty of care. Moreover, the pharmacist is unlikely to know at the
time of his or her referral whether the client will be able to fill her EC prescription elsewhere,
and the pharmacist therefore has not engaged in the same sort of balancing activity contemplated
in the ethics statements.49
The time-sensitive nature of EC means that honoring the pharmacists’ interest in refusing
and safeguarding a woman’s right of access may be mutually exclusive. Although allowing
pharmacists to refuse and refer might be a reasonable compromise in other circumstances,
adopting a refuse-and-refer protocol for EC requires a woman to enter a hall of mirrors in which
she must go from referring pharmacist to referring pharmacist, looking for a pharmacy that
stocks the drug and is willing to dispense it and that is open when she does not have to be at
school or work and that she can locate and reach before EC’s brief window of effectiveness
closes. In some locales, this convergence of conditions may not pose a significant barrier to
access, but other commentators have spoken to the considerable, potentially insurmountable
obstacles a refuse-and-refer protocol would pose for women, especially those in rural areas
where going to the next town may mean traveling miles without a reliable car or transit system,
or in politically conservative areas where pharmacist after pharmacist either does not stock the
drug or will not dispense it.50 Because the policy statements adopted by pharmacy organizations

49

Kelly Vyzral, the government affairs director for the Ohio Pharmacists Association, explains how the
balancing must work in order to safeguard both the pharmacist’s and the client’s interests: “‘The thing we stress is
that pharmacists provide the patient with access—either through another pharmacist on staff, or at another
pharmacy.’” Stephanie Irwin, Buying Plan B? You might need a backup plan, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 26,
2006, at A4. A bare refusal and referral, particularly when the referral is made offsite, cannot guarantee the client’s
access because the client may be refused at subsequent pharmacies.
50

See Katie Fairbanks, Waging a moral battle from behind the counter: Pharmacists’ refusal to fill
contraception prescriptions Prompts question of Whose choice is it to make?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 24,
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cannot in practice resolve the fundamental and in some cases irreconcilable conflict between the
two interests they seek to balance, case law construing pharmacists’ duty to dispense provides a
far firmer basis on which to assess the pharmacist’s duty of care.
In the context of prescription medications, then, case law strongly suggests that as a
matter of law, pharmacists have a legal duty to fill all safe, valid prescriptions. Applying this
rule to the EC controversy, pharmacists appear to have a legal duty to fill all valid EC
prescriptions presented by women 17 and under. Refusing to fill such a prescription for
undeniably nonmedical reasons impermissibly intrudes on the doctor-patient relationship,
compromises the medical care of the client, and constitutes a breach of the pharmacist’s duty to
dispense.
2.

Duty To Dispense Emergency Contraception As Nonprescription, Pharmacy-Only
Drug

These twin emphases, first on the need to ensure the client’s access to drugs already
deemed safe by a skilled evaluator, and second, the pharmacist’s unique position as the sole
point of distribution for those drugs, also cut sharply in favor of extending the pharmacist’s duty
to dispense to include nonprescription as well as prescription drugs. Indeed, classification of EC
as an over-the-counter drug indicates that little to no individualized medical oversight is required
to ensure its safe use by consumers. Where the risks and benefits of EC have already been
weighed not just by a single doctor but by the whole of the FDA, and where as a result of this
analysis the drug has been found to be so safe that no prescription at all is required for any users

2005, at 1A (noting that Texas has 199 towns with only one drug store and that those towns frequently have only
one pharmacist. A local Planned Parenthood official observed, “If someone wants to get emergency contraception
filled and they go to the one pharmacy and are refused, she then has to go 30 to 50 miles to the next town, and just
hope she can get the prescription filled in the time frame she has left.”). This hall of mirrors meant that a rape
victim in Tuscon had to spend three days trying to find an area pharmacy that even stocked EC, only to finally find it
stocked at a pharmacy where the pharmacist refused to dispense it for religious and moral reasons. McClain, supra
note 10.
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over the age of majority, allowing a pharmacist to deny access to the drug for nonmedical
reasons cannot advance public health. Absent any medical rationale for denying access to EC,
the pharmacist’s role as EC’s gatekeeper and sole supplier should control disposition of the issue
as it does in the prescription drug context.
Refusing pharmacists may argue that relegating the pharmacist to the role of mere
supplier fails to recognize the pharmacist’s specialized expertise and professional training and is
not appropriate where no doctor is providing more individualized care. In the absence of
physician oversight, the pharmacist, who deals directly with the client, may be better equipped
than is the FDA, which has no such direct or personalized knowledge, to provide individualized
care to a pharmacy client seeking information on or access to limited access, nonprescription
drugs. At least insofar as that rationale is used to deny for nonmedical reasons access to safe,
legal nonprescription drugs, however, that argument is unpersuasive because any individualized
care the pharmacists seek to provide is not pharmaceutical or medical in nature, and is therefore
incompatible with their role as the primary gatekeeper of EC. Though a pharmacist may have no
duty to dispense a nonprescription drug where he or she has a medically based reason for
denying such access (e.g., it would negatively interact with other drugs the client is taking or
would be unsafe or otherwise inappropriate for the client given allergies or other lifestyle
considerations such as the client’s willingness or ability to tolerate probable side effects), that
rationale does not hold where pharmacists’ refusals to dispense are not based on medical
considerations but rather are ethically or religiously motivated.51 The idea that pregnancy begins
51

The belief among refusing pharmacists that pregnancy commences at the moment of fertilization is at root
an ethical or religious belief, not a medical one. EC is classified by the FDA as a method of contraception (meaning
that it prevents pregnancy), not as an abortifacent, (meaning that it does not terminate a pregnancy). Gardiner
Harris, F.D.A. Gains Accord on Wider Sales of Next-Day Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006. This classification is far
from arbitrary. It is based jointly on the medical definition of when pregnancy begins and on the best available
scientific evidence as to how EC works. The medical establishment defines pregnancy as commencing not at
fertilization but several days later, when the fertilized egg successfully implants in the uterus. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R.

19

at conception may have merit from a particular philosophical or theological perspective, but
pharmacists are generally empowered to exercise professional discretion only on medical
grounds, not on philosophical or theological ones.52
Just as in the prescription drug context, there is neither a medical justification for
refusing to dispense EC, nor an alternative point of distribution for women 18 and older who
seek access to the drug. In light of the persuasive weight courts have afforded to these two
factors in past decisions construing the pharmacist’s duty, courts are likely to find that
pharmacists have a legal duty to dispense EC, and that a refusal to dispense EC constitutes a
breach of that duty.
B.

Impact Of State Refusal Clauses On Duty To Dispense

Increasingly, states are looking to refusal clauses as one way to counteract this duty to
dispense, attempting thereby to limit pharmacists’ tort liability for refusing to provide EC.

46.202(f) (1978) (“Pregnancy encompasses the period of time from implantation until delivery.”). There is no
evidence that EC disrupts an implanted egg or even inhibits the implantation of a fertilized egg. In fact, EC
generally works by inhibiting ovulation. Peres & Manier, supra note 7. EC has never been known to be effective
after fertilization. Id. The F.D.A.’s statement that Plan B “may” work by inhibiting implantation of a fertilized egg
is best understood as an example of the truism that one cannot definitely prove a negative. Id.
52

Even if, arguendo, pharmacists were permitted to dispense or withhold care on philosophical or religious
(but at any rate, nonmedical) grounds, a pharmacist’s personal beliefs as to when pregnancy begins should not trump
a right of access to EC. The best available medical evidence is that EC does not work if taken after ovulation, does
not interfere with implantation, and thus even by the refusing pharmacists’ nonmedical definitions of the term, does
not terminate a pregnancy. See Peres & Manier, supra note 7 (noting that evidence of the anti-implantation effects
of both caffeine consumption and breastfeeding children is stronger than evidence that EC inhibits implantation of a
fertilized egg. As one researcher explains, “We can’t prove it, but a lot of inferences are strongly supportive that
emergency contraception does not work after fertilization… Once [an egg] is fertilized, there’s not an iota of
evidence that says fertilization won’t go forward.” Id.). See also James Trussel et al., The role of emergency
contraception, AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNEC. (2004) 190, S30-8 (noting that in light of EC opponents’ belief that
pregnancy begins at fertilization, not at implantation, “[t]o make an informed choice, women must know that [EC]—
like all regular hormonal contraceptives such as the birth control pill, the patch Evra, the vaginal ring NuvaRing, the
injectable Lunelle, the injectable Depo-Provera and even breastfeeding—may prevent pregnancy by delaying or
inhibiting ovulation, inhibiting fertilization, or inhibiting implantation of a fertilized egg.”); Mary K. Collins,
Conscience Clauses and Oral Contraceptives: Conscientious Objection or Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANN.
HEALTH L. 37, 47 (2006) (noting that this claim of an anti-implantation effect is also baseless with respect to
traditional oral contraceptives). Even at this most charitable interpretation, a refusal to dispense EC on the grounds
that to do so could terminate a pregnancy by inhibiting implantation of a fertilized egg is unsupported speculation
grounded upon a nonmedical definition of the word “pregnancy.”
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Refusal clauses, sometimes alternatively referred to as conscience clauses, provide a statutory or
regulatory basis for health care workers of various stripes to refuse to participate in one or more
health services they find morally, religiously, or ethically objectionable.53 The scope of refusal
clauses varies by state, both in terms of what types of providers and which types of health
services they cover.54 Most refusal clauses apply only to abortion,55 a reflection of the
immediately post-Roe56 period in which they were adopted.57 Others apply only to abortion,

53

See generally, Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL
MEDICINE 177 (1993).
54

See generally, Id. at 189-90; Karissa Eide, Comment: Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control
Prescriptions on Moral or Religious Grounds?, 22 CAL. W. L. REV. 121, 126-44 (2005).

55

States with refusal clauses that apply only to abortion or “termination of pregnancy”: ALASKA STAT. §
18.16.010(b) (2005) (abortion); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 (2006) (abortion); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
123420 (West 2006) (abortion); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 1791(a) (2006) (pregnancy termination); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 453-16(d) (2003) (abortion); IDAHO CODE ANN. 18-612 (2004) (abortion); IND. CODE § 16-34-1-5(2004)
(abortion); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2002) (abortion); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2006) (pregnancy termination); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(4) (LexisNexis 2004) (abortion); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299:31(A) (2004) (abortion);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2004) (abortion); MINN. STAT. § 145.414(a) (2003) (abortion); MO.
REV. STAT. § 197.032(1) (2004) (abortion); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-20-111(2) (2004) (abortion); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-337 (2003) (abortion); NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.475(1) (2004) (abortion); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (West
2006) (pregnancy termination); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i(1) (Consol. 2004) (abortion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1445.1(e) (2004) (abortion); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14) (2003) (abortion); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91(D)
(LexisNexis 2004) (abortion); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741(B) (2004) (abortion); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(d)
(2004) (abortion); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (2003) (abortion); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(1) (2004)
(abortion); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2004) (abortion).
Although Georgia has been cited as one jurisdiction that has extended its refusal clause to cover pharmacists
refusing to dispense EC, see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE CLAUSES:
LAWS AND LEGISLATION (Aug. 2006), available at http:www.ncsl.org/programs/health/ConscienceClauses.htm (last
visited Aug. 25, 2006) [hereinafter NCSL State Conscience Clause Survey], Georgia’s statute only applies to
pharmacists who refuse to “fill a prescription for a drug which purpose is to terminate a pregnancy,” and states
explicitly, “Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize a pharmacist to refuse to fill a prescription for
birth control medication, including any process, device, or method to prevent pregnancy and including any drug or
device approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration for such purpose.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b)
(West 2006). Because Plan B is classified by the FDA as a contraceptive and not an abortifacent, Harris, supra note
51, the refusal clauses of the foregoing 28 states do not extend to refusing pharmacists and cannot be used to shield
such pharmacists from tort liability.
56

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1970).

57

Wardle, supra note 53 at 180.
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sterilization, artificial insemination or some combination thereof,58 while ten states include under
some circumstances contraception or family planning services within the scope of their refusal
clauses,59 and three more provide general rights of refusal for any procedure or service to which
a health care provider has an ethical or moral objection.60 These clauses usually specify what
types of recrimination refusing health care providers are shielded from, typically prohibiting
reprisals by employers or professional licensing boards or insulating refusing actors from
criminal or civil liability. All told, 45 states have some form of refusal clause on the books,61 as
has the federal government.62 In the 2006 legislative session, 21 states saw legislation
58

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12I (2006) (abortion and sterilization); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11
(2005); WIS. STAT. § 253.09(1) (2005) (sterilization and “removing a human embryo or fetus”). MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(a)(2)(ii) (West 2005) (artificial insemination, sterilization, and pregnancy termination).
59

Ten states have refusal clauses that under some circumstances apply to contraceptives. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-16-304(4) and (5) (2006) (contraceptives) in addition to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2006)
(abortion); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102(9) (2006) (contraceptives); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (2006)
(contraceptives or family planning services); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §1903(4) (2005) (family planning
services) and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1902(4) (defining “family planning services” to include contraception);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:11-9 (2006) (allowing hospitals to refuse to offer “sterilization of human beings, euthanasia,
birth control or any similar practice contrary to the dogmatic or moral beliefs of any well established religious body
or denomination”) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (2006) (abortion and sterilization); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225
(2005) (allowing employees of state Department of Human Services to refuse to offer “family planning and birth
control services”) and OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(1) (2005) (“termination of pregnancy”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
36-11-70 (2006) (pharmacist may refuse to dispense medication that would “destroy an unborn child”) and S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (defining “unborn child” to mean “an individual organism of the species homo
sapiens from fertilization until live birth.”); ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2006) (contraceptives); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 16-2B-4 (2006) (contraceptives); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005) (“family planning and birth
control services”).
60

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2006) (providing, “No physician or health care personnel shall be civilly or
criminally liable to any person, estate, public or private entity or public official by reason of his or her refusal to
perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or participate in any way in any particular form of health care
service which is contrary to the conscience of such physician or health care personnel.”). However, a subsequently
adopted emergency rule requires pharmacists to stock and dispense contraceptives—including EC—and, if
temporarily out of stock, refer a client seeking the drug to another pharmacy. 68 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1330.91(j). See
also MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-225(5) (2006) and MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b)); WASH. REV. CODE §
48.43.065(2)(a) (2006);
61

See supra notes 55, 58-60. Twenty-eight states have refusal clauses that apply only to abortion or
“termination of pregnancy;” five apply only to some combination of abortion, sterilization, and artificial
insemination; ten apply, at least under some circumstances, to contraception, and three provide broad, generally
applicable rights of conscience for health care providers. The five states that do not have some form of refusal
clause are Alabama, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Texas, and Vermont.

62

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2004) (applying only to abortion and sterilization)

22

introduced that would create or expand existing refusal clauses, in some cases specifically
including pharmacists’ refusals of EC or traditional contraception in their protections.63 Though
none of these bills passed, this number constituted a marked increase from the 2005 legislative
session, which saw such new or expanded refusal clauses introduced in only thirteen states.64
Because refusal clauses differ so widely among states, they do not lend themselves to
generalizations about their impact on pharmacists’ potential tort liability for refusing to dispense
EC. The applicability of any given refusal clause to the refusal-to-dispense-EC scenario will
depend potentially on two factors: what types of refusals the clause protects, and whose refusals
the clause protects.
Based on FDA’s classification of Plan B as a contraceptive rather than an abortifacent,65
the majority of existing refusal clauses, which apply only to refusals to perform or assist in
abortions, do not affect pharmacists’ duty to dispense EC. Refusal clauses including sterilization
and artificial insemination are similarly inapplicable to the EC context. Omitting these
jurisdictions from further analysis, only 13 states have enacted refusal clauses that could
potentially apply to a pharmacist’s refusal to dispense EC—ten that specifically protect refusals
involving contraception or family planning, and three that broadly protect any health care
provider’s conscientious objection. However, one of these latter three jurisdictions, Illinois, has
specifically limited the efficacy of its broad refusal clause with respect to EC and other forms of

63

NCSL State Conscience Clause Survey, supra note 55.

64

Id.

65

Harris, supra note 51.
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contraceptives, first by emergency rule adopted by Governor Rod Blagojevich,66 and
subsequently by administrative rule.67
Turning to the remaining 12 refusal clauses, three more must be omitted from further
analysis based on the type of actors they protect. New Jersey permits refusals to dispense
contraception, but only extends that right of refusal to hospitals.68 Because New Jersey’s refusal
clause encompasses only institutional entities rather than individual actors, it does not limit
individual pharmacists’ duty to dispense. Even hospital pharmacists are not covered by New
Jersey’s refusal clause so long as their employing hospital has chosen to stock EC. Oregon’s
refusal clause allows some individuals to refuse to dispense contraception, but limits its scope to
employees of the Oregon Department of Human Services. Pharmacists not employed by that
agency, including all pharmacists in private practice, therefore still have a duty to dispense EC.69
Finally, West Virginia’s refusal clause, which applies to all “family planning services,” covers
only “employee[s] of the State of West Virginia,”70 and therefore does not allow any pharmacist
working in private practice—at the corner pharmacy—to refuse to dispense.
Having identified and omitted from further analysis all existing refusal clauses irrelevant
on their face to a pharmacist’s duty to dispense EC, it appears that only nine states have adopted
refusal clauses that protect both the actor and the act—both the pharmacist and the refusal to

66

Press Release, Office of the Governor of Illinois, Gov. Blagojevich takes emergency action to protect
women’s access to contraceptives (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPress
Release.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=3805, last visited Oct. 16, 2006.

67

68 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1330.91(j).

68

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:11-9(2006); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (2006) (extending to only abortion
and sterilization).

69

OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 (2005). Oregon, like New Jersey, also has a separate refusal clause specific to
pregnancy termination. OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(1) (2005).
70

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2B-4 (2006).
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dispense EC: Arkansas,71 Colorado,72 Florida,73 Maine,74 Mississippi,75 South Dakota,76

71

(4) Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a physician, pharmacist, or any other authorized
paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive procedures, supplies, or
information; and
(5) No private institution or physician, nor any agent or employee of the institution or physician,
nor any employee of a public institution acting under directions of a physician shall be prohibited
from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information when the refusal is
based upon religious or conscientious objection. No such institution, employee, agent, or
physician shall be held liable for the refusal.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-394 (2006).

72

No private institution or physician, nor any agent or employee of such institution or physician,
shall be prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information
when such refusal is based upon religious or conscientious objection, and no such institution,
employee, agent, or physician shall be held liable for such refusal.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102(9) (2006).

73

The provisions of this section shall not be interpreted so as to prevent a physician or other person
from refusing to furnish any contraceptive or family planning service, supplies, or information for
medical or religious reasons; and the physician or other person shall not be held liable for such
refusal.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (2006).

74

No private institution or physician or no agent or employee of such institution or physician shall be
prohibited from refusing to provide family planning services when such refusal is based upon
religious or conscientious objection.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §1903(4) (2005). Maine defines “family planning services” to include
contraceptives. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1902(4).

75

(5) A health care provider may decline to comply with an individual instruction or healthcare decision for reasons of conscience…
…
(7) A health care provider or institution that declines to comply with an individualized instruction
of health care decision shall:
(a) Promptly so inform the patient, if possible, and any person then authorized to make
health-care decisions for the patient;
(b) Provide continuing care to the patient until a transfer can be effected; and
(c) Unless the patient or person then authorized to make health-care decisions for the patient
refuses assistance, immediately make all reasonable efforts to assist in the transfer of the
patient to another health-care provider or institution that is willing to comply with the
instruction or decision
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Tennessee,77 Washington,78 and Wyoming.79 Each of these states either explicitly states that it
includes pharmacists, uses general terms that are defined elsewhere to include pharmacists, or
uses general terms that probably include pharmacists. 80 Similarly, each clause either explicitly
encompasses refusals to dispense contraception, uses general terms that are defined elsewhere to

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-225(5) and (7) (2006). “Health care provider” is a defined term including
pharmacists. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b).
76

No pharmacist may be required to dispense medication if there is reason to believe that
the medication would be used to:
(1) Cause an abortion; or
(2) Destroy and unborn child as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(50A)…
No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section may be the basis for any claim for
damages against a pharmacist or the pharmacy of the pharmacist on the basis for any disciplinary,
recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the pharmacist.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006). South Dakota elsewhere defines “unborn child” as “an individual
organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A).
77

No private institution or physician, nor any agent or employee of such institution or physician,
shall be prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information
when such refusal is based upon religious or conscientious objection, and no such institution,
employee, agent, or physician shall be held liable for such refusal.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2006).
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No individual health care provider… may be required by law or contract in any circumstances to
participate in the provision of… a specific service if they object to so [sic] for reason of
conscience or religion. No person may be discriminated against in employment or professional
privileges because of such objection.
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065(2)(a) (2006).
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Any person may refuse to accept the duty of offering family planning and birth control services to
the extent the duty is contrary to his personal or religious beliefs. The refusal shall not be grounds
for:
(i) Any disciplinary action;
(ii) Dismissal;
(iii) Any departmental transfer;
(iv) Any other discrimination in employment;
(v) Suspension from employment; or
(vi) Any loss in pay or other benefits.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005).

80

Although one commentator has concluded that statutes extending rights of refusal to “private institutions”
or to agents or employees of such institutions probably do not extend rights of refusal to pharmacists, see Eide, supra
note 54, it is likely that any privately owned pharmacy would in fact qualify as a private institution, and any
pharmacist employed by such a pharmacy would thereby be protected by the statute.
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encompass refusals to dispense contraception, or broadly allows actors to refuse to participate in
any practice or process to which they morally or ethically object.
1.

Failure To Explicitly Preclude Civil Liability

Refusal clauses typically contain provisions specifically enumerating the types of
reprisals against which the clause insulates refusing actors.81 Although a number of these refusal
clauses do not specifically insulate refusing actors from civil liability,82 it is unlikely a court
would impose liability on a refusing pharmacist solely on the basis of such a statutory omission.
At least where liability would be imposed on negligence grounds, the existence of a refusal
clause covering pharmacists who refuse to dispense EC appears effectively to limit the
pharmacist’s duty of care with respect to that act. If a refusal to dispense, or a refusal to refer,83
does not violate the pharmacist’s duty of care, it cannot provide the basis for negligence liability,
regardless of whether or not the operative refusal clause states specifically that the pharmacist
will not be held liable for a refusal to dispense or refer. However, to the extent that a pharmacist
refuses to return a minor’s valid EC prescription or deliberately insults or humiliates a woman
seeking EC, even the broadest refusal clauses may not protect the pharmacist from charges of
theft or from claims of trespass to chattels or inflection of emotional distress. Though any such
claim would necessitate a highly fact-specific inquiry, the pharmacist’s actions underlying any
such claim probably exceed the scope of the actions protected by the operative refusal clause.
2.

Duty to Refer

81

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-394 (2006) (“No such institution shall be held liable for the refusal.”
Id.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 36-11-70 (2006) (“No such refusal… may be the basis for any claim for damages
against a pharmacist or the pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis of any disciplinary, recriminatory, or
discriminatory action against the pharmacist.” Id.).
82

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065(2)(a) (2006) (providing protection from employment or
professional discrimination stemming from refusal); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005) (same).
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See discussion in text infra, Section I.B.2
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Commentators who have argued that pharmacists do not have a duty to dispense EC have
admitted that refusing pharmacists probably do have a duty to refer and duly transfer clients
elsewhere.84 In fact, this is not universally true: five states’ refusal clauses appear to give
pharmacists a right to refuse to participate even in referring a client to a dispensing pharmacist.
Arkansas, Colorado, and Tennessee each have a refusal clause that provides a right of refusal
with respect to the provision of “contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information.”85 Florida
similarly states that no covered actor shall be prevented from “refusing to furnish any
contraceptive or family planning service, supplies, or information” if that refusal is made for
medical or religious reasons.86 These states’ refusal clauses, by including a largely unqualified
right of refusal with respect to contraceptive information—as distinct from contraceptive
services or supplies—arguably provide covered individuals with a right to refuse even to tell
clients where they might attempt to obtain such supplies. Washington’s refusal clause is also
sufficiently broad that it may allow covered individuals to refuse to refer: it states that health care
providers cannot be required “to participate in the provision of… a specific service if they object
for reason of conscience of religion.”87 Refusing pharmacists have argued that they should not
be required to refer clients elsewhere because making a referral still constitutes participation in
the provision of drugs to which they object.88 Because the act of making a referral requires a
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Herb, supra note 21 at 90; Rambaud, supra note 21 at 221; Cantor & Baum, supra note 18 at 2011.
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ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-349(4), (5) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102(9) (2006); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-34-105(5) (2006) (emphasis added).
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FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (2006).
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WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065(2)(a) (2006).
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See, e.g., Stein, supra note 9.
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pharmacist to participate, albeit indirectly, in a client’s attempt to obtain EC, Washington courts
may interpret the state’s refusal clause to allow pharmacists to refuse to refer clients.
On the other hand, Maine, South Dakota, and Wyoming, which provide rights of refusal
for “providing family planning services,”89 “dispens[ing of] medication,”90 and “offering family
planning and birth control services,”91 respectively, each have refusal clauses too narrow to
encompass refusals to refer. Further, Mississippi’s refusal clause explicitly affirms that a
refusing pharmacist must provide continuing care to the client and, unless the client refuses
further assistance, must “immediately make all reasonable efforts to assist in the transfer of the
patient to another health-care provider or institution” who will dispense the medication the client
seeks.92 In these four states, then, a refusing pharmacist must nonetheless assist the client to
obtain EC through alternative channels. In these jurisdictions, a failure, much less a refusal, to
refer breaches the pharmacists’ duty of care, notwithstanding the refusal clauses that protect the
pharmacist from having to dispense.
In no state does the refusal clause permit the refusing pharmacist to refuse to return the
client’s prescription or to harass or insult the client.
C.

Refusal To Dispense As Civil Disobedience: The Impact on Tort
Liability

In light of this general duty to dispense, what should be made of pharmacist refusals? It
is true that some pharmacists have stated publicly they believe they are within their rights in
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ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1903(4) (2005).
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S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006).
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005).
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MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-225(7) (2006).
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refusing to dispense drugs to which they morally object.93 “Pro-life” interest groups have
certainly tried to foster this view,94 and policy statements from national pharmacy associations
have also furthered this understanding,95 albeit less stridently. However, the pharmacy
community is well aware that the legality of such refusals are, at best, in dispute,96 and individual
pharmacists have been subject to licensure or workplace sanctions and employment terminations
stemming from their refusals.97 Pharmacists are therefore on notice that by refusing to dispense
drugs such as EC on nonmedical grounds, they may be acting in violation of the law.
Refusals to dispense EC may be best understood as acts of civil disobedience: an
intentional violation of a legal duty, which violation is undertaken to protest a law or requirement
the protester believes to be immoral.98 Courts generally do not recognize civil disobedience as a
defense to criminal or civil liability. On the contrary, “it is commonly concluded that the
exercise of a moral judgment based upon individual standards does not carry with it legal
justification or immunity from punishment for a breach of the law.”99 The moral and ethical
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See e.g., Frankel, supra note 8.
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See Stein, supra note 9; Jim Suhr, Pharmacists won’t give in on pills: Suspended for not dispensing
emergency contraceptives, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at A11.
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In re Noesen, supra note 12 (professional sanction); Suhr, supra note 94 (employment termination);
Associated Press, Protest follows denial of morning-after pill, Feb. 24, 2004 (available at
www.cnn.com/2004/US/Southwest/02/03/pharmacy.protest.ap/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2006) (unspecified
disciplinary action).
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See generally Kevin H. Smith, Therapeutic Civil Disobedience: A Preliminary Exploration, 31 U. MEM. L.
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U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 108 (4th Cir. 1969). See also ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND
CIVIL DEMOCRACY (1968); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 328 (1964) (J. White, dissenting); Forman v.
City of Montgomery, 245 F.Supp. 17, 24-25 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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convictions of refusing pharmacists, though no doubt sincere, therefore do not provide them
special protection from an otherwise-applicable duty to dispense.
II.

Example Of Pharmacist Tort Liability: Wrongful Conception
A.

Elements, Generally

Wrongful conception, sometimes called “wrongful pregnancy,” is one of the so-called
“birth torts.”100 Courts generally treat wrongful conception as a medical malpractice action
brought under a theory of negligence101 and have assessed damages in accordance with
traditional tort liability theory.102 Wrongful conception claims have arisen most frequently in the
context of a failed sterilization procedure, whether a vasectomy or tubal ligation or cauterization,
when the patient who believed himself or herself to be sterile subsequently conceives. In such
surgical sterilization cases, the traditional elements of negligence are straightforward: the doctor
breaches the duty of care owed to his or her patient by improperly performing a surgical
sterilization; this breach is the proximate cause of an unplanned pregnancy; and the unplanned
pregnancy results in damages to the patient.103 This action is widely recognized—32 of the 33
jurisdictions to consider the question have treated wrongful conception as a cognizable tort.104
100

Courts have not adopted standardized terms when referring to the birth torts, sometimes appearing to use
the terms “wrongful birth,” “wrongful life,” “wrongful conception,” and wrongful pregnancy” interchangeably to
refer to the cause of action in which an act or omission by a medical professional with respect to temporary or
permanent contraceptive methods proximately causes an unplanned pregnancy. To avoid confusion, this article uses
the term “wrongful conception” to refer to all such causes of action, regardless of what term any given court might
have used.
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See e.g. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 720 (Ala. 1982); Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743,
747 (N.C. 1986); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 432 (Md. 1984); Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 467
(Ca. 1967).
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Jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions on the question of precisely which damages are
recoverable, see Section II.B.3., infra, but these differing results are always couched in terms of traditional tort
theory.

103

See e.g. James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E. 2d 872, 876 (W. Va. 1985).
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Nevada has held that wrongful conception is not actionable in that state because “the birth of a normal,
healthy child is not ‘legally compensable damages in tort;’” however, the court allowed recovery for the medical,
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Although wrongful conception claims have most frequently involved surgical
sterilization procedures, two jurisdictions have recognized the tort in the context of more
temporary forms of birth control. In Jackson v. Bumgartner, the North Carolina Supreme Court
imposed liability on a doctor who negligently failed to reinsert a woman’s intrauterine device
(“IUD”) after performing emergency uterine surgeries.105 Finding no basis for distinguishing
between permanent and temporary contraceptive methods for the purpose of assessing liability,
the Jackson court held that “[t]here appears to be no compelling reason to limit a patient’s right
to non-negligent health care to permanent sterilization as opposed to the insertion of an IUD.”106
Even more directly applicable to the EC context, a Michigan court found a pharmacist
liable when he negligently dispensed tranquilizers instead of the birth control pills his client had
been prescribed.107 The plaintiff, erroneously believing that she was taking birth control pills,
became pregnant, and she subsequently sued her pharmacist for wrongful conception. The
Troppi court, noting that pharmacists are “held to a very high standard of care in filling
prescriptions,” held that “the possibility that [Mrs. Troppi] might become pregnant was certainly
a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s failure to fill a prescription for birth control pills;
we therefore could not say that it was not a proximate cause of the birth of the child.”108 The
Troppi court construed those facts as a clear-cut case of tort liability: “We have here a negligent,

surgical, and hospital expenses associated with an improper surgical sterilization under contract theory. Szekeres v.
Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986). This distinction between contract and tort may preclude recovery in Nevada
for wrongful conception in the context of a pharmacist who denies a client EC because there arguably exists no
contract between client and pharmacist prior to the pharmacist’s dispensing of the drugs.
105

Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986).
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Id. at 749.
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Id. at 513.
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wrongful act by the defendant, which act directly and proximately caused injury to the
plaintiffs.”109
B. Wrongful Conception Flowing from Refusal to Dispense EC
Although case law indicates courts’ willingness to apply the elements of wrongful
conception broadly, having already extended liability to temporary birth control and to
pharmacist-provided care, no case has yet been brought seeking to impose wrongful conception
liability on a pharmacist who has refused to dispense EC or prescription contraceptives. With
the FDA’s August 2006 approval of limited over-the-counter access to EC,110 and EC’s
increasingly high profile due to increased media coverage and public education work efforts, it
seems likely that both the demand for EC and the frequency of refusals by pharmacists to
dispense the drug will continue to rise. Because the effectiveness of EC is so highly timesensitive, each refusal to dispense causes a delay that decreases the drug’s effectiveness and
makes pregnancy more likely. It may therefore be useful to sketch out how the elements of a
wrongful conception claim might apply to a pharmacist’s breach of a legal duty to dispense EC.
1.

Breach and Causation—The Goldilocks Approach to Balancing Title VII
and Tort Liability

It is perhaps a truism that when a woman has been denied access to an effective form of
post-coital contraceptives that she has every right to obtain and use, that denial of access has
“caused” any resulting pregnancy. It is even more obvious that where there is no breach—no
refusal, in this case—the causation element of a negligence claim cannot be satisfied. And yet
these two obvious statements notwithstanding, simply requiring all pharmacists to fill every
109

Id. at 514.
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U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access for Plan B for Women 18
and Older, Prescription Remains Required for Those 17 and Under, Aug. 24, 2006, at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01436.html (last accessed Aug. 29, 2006).
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request for EC they encounter may not be legally viable under Title VII, which requires
employers, where possible, to reasonably accommodate their employees’ sincerely held religious
beliefs. How can pharmacies walk this tightrope between pharmacists’ Title VII claims and
women’s wrongful conception claims? Quite simply, they can do so by accommodating
employees’ religious beliefs where they can, but never at the expense of clients’ timely, on-site
access to EC. This approach satisfies employers’ Title VII responsibility while ensuring that the
pharmacy never breaches its duty to dispense the drug.
Title VII prohibits discrimination, including religious discrimination, in the workplace.111
This prohibition on religious discrimination does not require employers to recognize a total right
of refusal for pharmacists;112 it requires merely that employers provide “reasonable
accommodations”113 for pharmacists who harbor religious objections to filling contraceptive
prescriptions.114 Such reasonable accommodations might include “asking another pharmacist to
fill the prescription; assigning the pharmacist to work only on shifts or in stores where another
non-objecting pharmacist is on duty; or assigning the pharmacist to a line or place of work not
involving the dispensation of prescription contraceptives.”115 No absolute right of refusal is
recognized by Title VII, however. If an employer cannot make any of these accommodations
without incurring “undue hardship,”116—for example, in a small pharmacy where staffing the
pharmacy at all times with a second, EC-dispensing pharmacist would require additional staff
111

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-1 (2000).
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See Chanrasekhar, supra note 18, at 170-72.
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See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 and 70 (1986).
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Id. at 171.
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Id. at 68-69; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977).
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hires—Title VII does not require employers to accommodate refusing pharmacists at all costs.117
Any accommodation that would impose more than a de minimis cost on an employer constitutes
an undue hardship and is not required by Title VII.118 Under this de minimis rule, any
accommodation that cannot ensure timely, on-site access to EC is likely not required by Title
VII, as it would alienate clients and cause the pharmacy to lose business. 119 Where allowing a
pharmacist to refuse to dispense would mean client access could not be ensured, employers may,
without running afoul of Title VII, require their pharmacists to dispense EC.
Failure to make available reasonable accommodations violates Title VII where such
accommodations are feasible; but where they are not, failure to require pharmacists to dispense
EC subjects both employer and employee to liability. Between these poles of under-protection
and over-protection120 lies a solution that is just right. A pharmacy policy that is precisely coextensive with the requirements of Title VII—providing pharmacists no more and no less
protection than they are allowed under that law—will protect collaterally against tort liability by
ensuring, by whatever mechanism, that women are able to access EC where and when they need
it. Where access is ensured, there is no breach, and therefore no causation.
2.

Proximate Causation and Harm

As the wrongful conception cases, and Troppi in particular, recognize, pregnancy is a
foreseeable result of a medical professional’s failure to provide competent contraceptive care to a
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See generally Amy Bergquist, Note, Dispensing (With) Religious Accommodation Under Title VII, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1073 (2006).
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Allowing pharmacists to refuse to dispense overprotects the rights of pharmacists at the expense of their
female clients; requiring them to dispense even where reasonable accommodations exist overprotects women at the
expense of pharmacists’ Title VII rights.

35

patient.121 At least where the client has diligently attempted and failed to secure such care
elsewhere, the pharmacist’s failure to provide competent care is the proximate cause of any
resulting pregnancy.122 As the New Hampshire Supreme Court observed when it recognized the
actionability of wrongful conception claims, “Non-recognition of any cause of action for
wrongful conception leaves a void in the area of recovery for medical malpractice and dilutes the
standard of professional conduct and expertise in the area of family planning, which has been
clothed with constitutional protection.”123
In those jurisdictions where a pharmacist may refuse to dispense but has a duty to refer, a
refusal to refer may constitute the proximate cause of a subsequent pregnancy. It is well
documented that a delay in beginning the course of EC dramatically decreases the effectiveness
of the treatment. A refusal to refer exacerbates this urgency, particularly where the pharmacist
knows with reasonable certainty where a client might obtain EC but instead puts the client in a
position where she must spend hours or even days searching for an alternative source. Even if
the client is able to obtain EC at a much later time, the pharmacist’s refusal to refer may be said
to have “caused” the pregnancy in that it forced the woman seeking treatment to delay her
treatment until a later time, perhaps a much later time, when the effectiveness of EC would have
been substantially lower.
3.

Damages

Although most jurisdictions recognize the tort of wrongful conception, three competing
methods have emerged for assessing compensatory damages flowing from such claims. It is not
disputed that the costs associated with pregnancy and birth are compensable in a wrongful
121
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conception action. These damages include prenatal care, childbirth, prenatal and postnatal care,
physical and mental pain suffered by the woman as a result of the pregnancy and birth, lost
wages due to prenatal care and postnatal recovery, and loss of consortium during pregnancy and
immediately thereafter.124 In the case of negligently performed sterilization procedures,
compensatory damages may also include the cost of the initial, unsuccessful surgery and a
second operation, if obtained.125
More controversial is the question of whether costs of childrearing through the age of
majority are recoverable in a wrongful conception action. California, recognizing that
childrearing is a costly endeavor that can have a real and negative financial effect on a family
who had not anticipated and had in fact sought to avoid that cost, has implied that childrearing
costs are wholly recoverable because such recovery will “replenish the family exchequer so that
the new arrival will not deprive other members of the family of what was planned as their just
share of the family income.”126 Although lower California courts have followed a different
theory of recovery in practice,127 Custodio is frequently cited in favor of the “full recovery”
rule.128 The majority of states have taken the opposite view, holding that childrearing costs are,
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See e.g. James G. v. Caserta and Jennifer S. v. Kirdnual (consolidated), 332 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va.
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as a matter of law, not recoverable in wrongful conception actions.129 Courts have advanced four
rationales for denying such recovery. First, courts have held that the speculative nature of such
costs bars their recovery.130 Second, the cost of childrearing is out of proportion to the
defendant’s negligence.131 Third, courts have expressed concern that assessing the cost of
childrearing as a damages element “could have a significant impact on the stability of the family
unit and the subject child” or is otherwise contrary to public policy.132 Fourth, some courts have
made a policy choice that as a matter of law, “the benefits of the birth of a healthy, normal child
outweigh the expense of rearing a child” and the existence of the child cannot constitute an
element of damage.133 Finally, a small minority of six states has attempted to split the difference
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between these two poles of full recovery and total denial of recovery for childrearing costs; this
third way is known as the “benefit rule.” 134 The benefit rule requires the negligent defendant to
compensate the plaintiff-parents in a wrongful conception claim for all childrearing costs until
the child reaches the age of majority, but offsets the plaintiff-parents’ recovery with the benefits
the parents derive from their relationship with their child.135 So while women pursuing claims
for wrongful conception may generally expect, if successful, to recover for damages flowing
from prenatal, delivery, and postnatal care, as well as any lost wages or loss of consortium
claims that might be relevant, their ability to recover childrearing costs will depend on the
jurisdiction in which they bring their claim.
In addition to the compensatory damages stemming from a negligence claim, women
who have been refused EC and who subsequently conceive or suffer some other injury as a result
may be able to recover punitive damages from the denying pharmacist. In many jurisdictions,
punitive damages are available where the defendant has acted with “reckless indifference to the
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rights of others.”136 Recklessness may be assessed by either an objective or a subjective
standard. A finding of recklessness requires that the actor “realizes or, from facts which he
knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though he
hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless."137 Because reckless indifference “is
almost never admitted, and can be proved only by the conduct and the circumstances,”
recklessness is generally assessed by an objective measure. 138 But even by a more stringent,
subjective, measure pharmacists’ refusals to dispense EC are reckless. Refusing pharmacists
object to medical technologies that could impede the creation or development of a zygote,139 and
by their refusals seek to preserve the existence or formation of a zygote. Their refusals
acknowledge that denying women access to EC creates a substantial probability that a woman
will become—or, as they would put it—“remain” pregnant. This awareness of the risks
associated with refusing to dispense EC satisfies the recklessness standard required to justify an
award of punitive damages.
A further argument could be made in favor of punitive damages based on the public
role of the pharmacy profession and consequent deterrent effect of imposing punitive damages
on the pharmacist. At least one court has held that “[p]unitive damages are especially
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appropriate if the wrongdoer occupies a position of trust with members of the general public as
well as with the victim.”140 Pharmacists are among the most public of public health officials,
dispensing all prescription drugs and some nonprescription drugs, frequently working in a
capacity where they interact directly with and provide advice to the public.
Finally, the very nature of the relationship between the refusing pharmacist and the ECseeking client may support an award of punitive damages. Previous cases have recognized
malpractice claims for emotional distress where the medical services, such as those relating to
birth or death, “carry with them deeply emotional responses in the event of breach.”141 In such
cases, a breach of duty “will necessarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering”142
and punitive damages may be supported. Deliberately causing a woman to become pregnant
against her will by refusing to provide her with post-coital contraceptives to which she is legally
entitled might reasonably, if not necessarily, result in mental anguish to the woman, and might
therefore support an award of punitive damages on these grounds.
The question of whether punitive damages are permissible is highly fact specific, but in
light of the pharmacists’ role as a trusted figure in public health and the denying pharmacist’s
subjective recklessness, plaintiffs injured by a pharmacist’ refusal to dispense EC may be able to
recover punitive damages.
C. Vicarious Employer Liability
Several large pharmacy chains have adopted corporate policies that permit pharmacists to
refuse to dispense EC. When pharmacists at Target and Walgreens, for example, refuse to
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dispense EC, they do it with the approval of their employers,143 even if their actions are not
supported by law. These employers may be held liable in tort for the actions of the refusing
pharmacists they employ under the theory of vicarious liability. An employer may be held liable
for the torts of an employee where the employee’s tortuous activity was within the scope of his
or her employment.144 An employee’s action may be said to be within the scope of employment
where “the employee has the employer’s authority to perform the action.”145 In addition to their
exposure to assessments of compensatory damages, employers who authorize their pharmacist
employees to refuse to dispense EC may be exposing themselves to awards of punitive damages.
Even under the relatively restrictive scheme proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an
assessment of punitive damages may be appropriate against an employer or other principal where
the principal authorized, ratified, or approved of the agent’s actions. 146 These conditions are
satisfied where an employer has explicitly granted permission to pharmacist employees to refuse
to dispense EC. Alternatively, an employer may be able to avoid vicarious liability, both for
compensatory and punitive damages, where a refusal to dispense is outside the scope of a
pharmacist’s employment147—for example, where the employer has instructed its pharmacist
employees to fill all safe, valid prescriptions even where the pharmacist has personal,
nonmedical objections to doing so, or by allowing pharmacists to refuse to dispense only where
another pharmacist on duty can fill the prescription with no interruption in client service.
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III. Conclusion
Individuals are confronted every day with ethical choices, from how they make their
money to how they spend their time to the countless other decisions that fill the spaces in
between work and leisure. Workplaces are hardly immune from ethical pressures. Few would
dispute that to a pharmacist who genuinely believes EC may act as a form of abortion, and for
whom abortion is something approaching murder, the issue of how to handle requests for EC
must have very high stakes, and may be a very difficult decision. But the pharmacist does not
act in a vacuum; his or her personal beliefs are not the only relevant question. By the nature of
their profession, pharmacists have a unique role in the delivery of health care. They have a
monopoly on the distribution of prescription drugs and even control access to some
nonprescription drugs, including EC. Without the assent of a pharmacist, a client may be unable
to access safe medical treatments, even where a doctor with direct knowledge of the patient’s
condition and medical history has determined what course of treatment is most advisable. Case
law strongly supports the existence of the pharmacist’s legal duty to dispense all safe, validly
prescribed or legally available drugs requested by a pharmacy client. Though this duty may be
limited in some states by refusal clauses, the refusal clauses enacted by most states do not protect
a pharmacist’s refusal to dispense EC. In most states, therefore, a refusal to dispense EC exposes
both the refusing pharmacist and the employing pharmacy to tort liability.
Some pharmacists will no doubt continue refusing to dispense EC in spite of the illegality
of their actions. Others will lobby their state governments to pass more expansive refusal clauses
that would clearly protect pharmacists’ ethically or morally motivated refusals. Still others may
rethink their decision to refuse to dispense EC altogether in light of the legal risks that such a
refusal entails. Any of these outcomes is preferable to the status quo, in which pharmacists are
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being misled by their professional organizations and by lobbyists who intimate or openly counsel
that a pharmacist’s right to refuse is undisputed. This inaccurate counsel may be leading
pharmacists to engage in what amounts to civil disobedience without an awareness of the legal
risk to which they are exposing themselves and their employers.
It is the nature of any duty analysis to focus on the potentially liable actor. But at the risk
of sounding circular, I end this article the way it began: by redirecting our focus on the women
who step up to the pharmacy window, sliding their prescriptions across the counter or staring
down a hostile employee on the other side as they say, “I’m here for Plan B.” Medicine, after
all, is a patient-centered profession, and pharmacists are medical professionals. For a woman
who is refused access to EC even though she has every right to that drug, that statement probably
seems like an empty platitude. Pharmacist refusals are conclusive, disempowering; there may be
no effective, immediate recourse. They moot a woman’s legally undisputed right of access to
this effective, safe drug. Though the option of after-the-fact tort litigation may be small comfort
indeed to a woman who was refused EC, it is one step toward correcting the current balance of
power in which the personal beliefs of the pharmacist can always outweigh those of the
pharmacist’s client.
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